Anthropic vs OpenAI: Corporate Governance Structure

OpenAI and Anthropic both use a Delaware public benefit corporation (PBC) so directors can weigh a charter mission against shareholder returns. They lock that mission in opposite ways. OpenAI puts legal control in a nonprofit parent whose powers were written into attorney-general conditions. Anthropic splits control between an independent purpose trust that elects a board majority and a founder vehicle that holds 50.1% of the general vote. Neither design is “mission language.” Both are control designs. The historical record says control designs hold; purpose language alone does not.

OpenAI: nonprofit control, written as a regulatory condition

On October 28, 2025, OpenAI completed a recapitalization that the California and Delaware attorneys general had spent roughly a year forcing into a narrower shape than the company first proposed. The nonprofit, renamed the OpenAI Foundation, kept the sole power to appoint and remove directors of the for-profit, now OpenAI Group PBC. At closing the Foundation held about 26% of the PBC, valued by the company at roughly $130 billion. Microsoft held roughly 27% (about $135 billion, down from about 32.5% on an as-converted basis). Employees and other investors held the rest, about 47%. Microsoft is the largest outside economic owner and has no board-appointment right. Control and capital point at different parties. [1] [2] [3]

The attorneys general did not “approve” the deal. Delaware issued a statement of no objection conditioned on commitments; California signed a memorandum of understanding and said it would not sue. Those conditions are the enforceable core, not the PBC label:

• The Foundation keeps sole power to appoint PBC directors and power to remove them.
• On safety and security, PBC directors must consider only the charitable mission and may not consider stockholders’ pecuniary interests.
• The board-level Safety and Security Committee stays at the Foundation, not the PBC, and can require mitigations up to halting a model release even when internal risk thresholds would allow release. Its chair (initially Zico Kolter) sits on the Foundation board, not the PBC board, with full observation rights into PBC meetings.
• The PBC’s mission tracks the nonprofit’s and the OpenAI Charter. The company must give the AGs advance notice of major governance changes, meet with them on a set cadence, and stay and expand in California.
• Within a year, a second Foundation director was to serve only on the Foundation and as a non-voting PBC observer. [4] [5] [6] [7]

Commercial terms moved the other way. Microsoft’s IP rights run through 2032, including AGI models once an independent panel verifies an AGI declaration, and OpenAI committed to an additional $250 billion of Azure purchases. Microsoft gave up a right of first refusal on compute and can pursue AGI on its own. The nonprofit’s equity is large, but Microsoft’s economic and contractual position is large enough to matter even without a board seat. [2] [8]

A year later the structure is being tested, not just described. In November 2026 the Delaware Department of Justice sent an investigative subpoena tied to safety commitments made at the recapitalization, after a Hugging Face-related incident. That is the mechanism working as designed: the enforcer is a state AG representing charitable beneficiaries, not a minority shareholder. Whether the commitments have teeth is now an open enforcement question, not a charter question. [9]

Anthropic: a trust elects the board; founders keep the stockholder vote

Anthropic is already a Delaware PBC whose charter purpose is the responsible development and maintenance of advanced AI for the long-term benefit of humanity. The PBC form gives directors legal cover to balance stockholders, people affected by the company’s conduct, and that purpose. It does not decide who chooses the directors. Anthropic added a second layer in 2023: a Long-Term Benefit Trust, a Delaware purpose trust whose trustees are not supposed to hold Anthropic securities, holding Class T stock with no economic rights and the power to elect a board majority. [10] [11]

The October 26, 2026 S-1 (Nasdaq listing sought under ANT; not yet a completed IPO as of early November 2026) freezes a five-class structure:

• Class T (one share, Long-Term Benefit Trust): elects the Class T directors, a majority of the authorized board (four of seven). No economic rights.
• Class F (one share, Founder LLC of the seven co-founders): 50.1% of total voting power on matters submitted to stockholders generally. No economic rights. Continuing founders each have a vote on how that share is cast.
• Class A (public and existing holders): one vote per share and pro rata economics. Together with Class F, elects the other directors.
• Class N (strategic partners, including convertible positions associated with Amazon and Google): generally non-voting, same economics as Class A, converts to Class A on a public sale or a transfer to an unaffiliated holder at or below 9.99%.
• Class E (employees, excluding co-founders): limited votes on specified governance matters, including parts of the trust-amendment path. [12] [13] [14]

Because the trust can elect a board majority, Anthropic expects to be a Nasdaq controlled company. Neither the trust’s director power nor the Class F vote has a calendar sunset. Trustees are paid by the company (the S-1 disclosed about $8.4 million paid to the trust in the nine months ended September 30, 2026, and cash trustee fees not tied to profits). Recent trustees have included Neil Shah (chair), Richard Fontaine, Ben Bernanke, and Christopher Stubbs, with a seat vacant at filing. [15] [16]

The override is real but expensive. The S-1’s “Trust Amendment Threshold” lets the trust or Class T be changed, or Class T redeemed for nothing, only if:

• trustees favor the change: 80% of authorized board seats and 80% of trustees in office; or
• trustees oppose it and Class F is still out: for the first three years after the IPO, unanimous continuing founders plus a majority of Class E votes cast plus a majority of Class A votes cast; at any time, two-thirds of continuing founders, 75% of Class E votes cast, and a majority of Class A votes cast; or
• no Class F remains and trustees oppose it: 85% of outstanding Class A. [15] [17]

Public Class A holders therefore cannot fire the trust-elected majority, cannot outvote the founders on ordinary matters, and cannot unwind the trust without the founders and a large employee vote. In October 2026 Anthropic also committed shares to an Anthropic Public Benefit Fund (an LLC, not a 501(c)(3)): 5% now, plus discretionary additions as value rises, with employee pledges bringing dedicated shares toward roughly 20%. That is an economic dedication, not a control right. [18]

How the two AI designs differ under pressure

	OpenAI (post-Oct 2025)	Anthropic (S-1 structure, Oct 2026)
Who picks the board	Nonprofit Foundation, exclusively	Trust elects a majority; founders plus Class A elect the rest
Who wins a stockholder vote	Not the public float in any operational sense; Foundation control is structural, not a super-vote share	Founder LLC’s single Class F share, 50.1%
Mission legal form	PBC, plus AG-mandated rule that safety decisions ignore stockholder money interests	PBC balancing duty only
Hard stop on a model	Foundation Safety and Security Committee can halt release	No equivalent external halt right disclosed; trust acts by electing and removing directors
Outside capital’s lever	Microsoft ~27% economics and a long IP/cloud contract, no board appointment	Amazon/Google largely in non-voting Class N
Who can sue or unwind it	AGs can enforce the non-objection conditions; ordinary PBC derivative suits face the Delaware 2% / $2 million threshold and a statutory safe harbor	Trust override only at the amendment threshold above; same thin PBC derivative path for balancing claims
What has already been tested	Original plan to drop nonprofit control was blocked by AGs; a 2026 Delaware subpoena is probing whether safety commitments are being kept	Not yet public; the trust’s majority was phased in before the filing, so the design has operated privately, not under a public float

The practical difference is the identity of the residual controller. At OpenAI, the party that can fire the board does not get richer by shipping a risky model, and a state official can go to court if the nonprofit stops behaving like one. At Anthropic, the party that can fire a board majority is a trust of disinterested trustees, but the party that can still carry every ordinary stockholder vote is the founding group. A safety fight that is a board fight favors the trust. A safety fight that is a charter amendment, a financing, or a sale favors the founders unless employees and the public also line up. Stacking both is stricter than either alone, and stricter than a plain dual-class PBC. It is not the same thing as OpenAI’s regulator-backed nonprofit parent.

Delaware PBC law, clarified in July 2026 in Drakes Landing, does not require directors to maximize sale price. They must balance stockholder money, affected stakeholders, and the charter benefit, and they get a safe harbor if the decision is informed, disinterested, and not one no person of ordinary judgment would approve. Only stockholders holding 2% (or, if listed, the lesser of 2% or $2 million of market value) can sue to enforce that balance. Beneficiaries of the mission cannot. A PBC charter is a shield for directors, not a sword for the public. [19] [20]

What other mission and control designs have actually done

Company	Control mechanism	Mission enforceability	Shareholder remedies	What happened under pressure
Meta	Zuckerberg’s 10-vote Class B: about 61% of votes on roughly 13% of the equity. 2026 Class C non-voting dividend lets the company raise capital and lets him sell a slice without giving up votes. No meaningful time sunset.	None. Ordinary Delaware corporation. “Long-term vision” is a founder preference, not a legal duty to anyone but stockholders.	Public holders can propose; they cannot win. Fiduciary suits are the real remedy and are hard. Controlled-company exemptions available.	Metaverse spending on the order of tens of billions could not be stopped by owners of most of the stock. A majority of independent holders has repeatedly backed one-share-one-vote; founder votes defeat it. Class C plan was approved by his written consent, not a Class A vote.
Alphabet	Page and Brin jointly above 50% of votes on roughly 11–12% of equity via 10-vote Class B. Class C is non-voting, created so acquisitions and equity comp would not dilute control.	None beyond ordinary fiduciary duties.	Same pattern: one-share-one-vote resolutions have failed for more than a decade because founders vote them down. 2012–14 Class C fight settled with issuance limits, not one-share-one-vote.	Founder control has held through product failures, regulatory crises, and institutional campaigns. Investors who want a vote already priced that in, or they own Class C and have none.
Snap	Public Class A has zero votes. Founders’ Class C has 10 votes and, at IPO, about 88–89% of voting power. Control lasts until both founders die or they sell down past a charter trigger.	None. The prospectus’s theory was that founders need years free of quarterly pressure.	No director election, no Rule 14a-8 proposals, and historically a path to skip a full proxy statement because the registered class does not vote. Remedy is sell, or sue for a fiduciary breach.	By 2026 the stock was down about 75% from the 2017 listing. Activist Irenic could publish a turnaround plan and could not threaten a vote. Founder control held; the “long-term vision” justification did not produce a durable premium.
Warby Parker	Delaware PBC and certified B Corp, plus 10-vote Class B for co-CEOs Blumenthal and Gilboa (a 2025-proxy analysis put them near 58% combined). Unused non-voting Class C is authorized. Class B converts to Class A on October 1, 2031, or earlier on transfer, departure, or 12 months after death or disability.	PBC balancing duty and biennial benefit report. B Lab recertification is private and revocable. Charter public benefits: access to vision care and community impact.	Ordinary stockholders cannot outvote Class B until sunset. Balancing-duty suits face the 2% / $2 million PBC threshold and the safe harbor.	Mission and founder control have coexisted because the founders still want both. The sunset is the unusual part: control is scheduled to end, which Meta and Alphabet refused. Untested against a founder who wants to drop the benefit.
Lemonade	One share, one vote. Classified board. PBC since before the 2020 IPO. Charter public benefit is insurance products where charitable giving is a core feature.	Deleting the benefit, or merging into a non-PBC or a PBC without the same benefit language, needs two-thirds of outstanding voting stock. Giveback is still a board decision subject to insurance capital constraints, not an automatic dividend.	Derivative suit to enforce balancing requires 2% ownership. Classified board and plurality elections slow a board fight.	The mission has not been formally unwound. It also has not stopped the board from sizing Giveback to regulatory capital. Soft, charter-level lock with real shareholder votes.
Coursera	One share, one vote. Classified board; directors removable only for cause by 66⅔%. Converted to a PBC in February 2021 before the IPO. Also a B Corp.	Same Delaware PBC machinery: balancing duty, benefit report, narrow derivative standing. No founder super-vote.	A majority of voting power elects the board over time. Supermajority only for removal for cause, not for ordinary strategy.	In the announced Udemy combination, the surviving company was set to keep the Coursera name and PBC status. Mission survived a change-of-control negotiation because both sides agreed to keep it, not because outsiders were legally barred from dropping it.
Patagonia (private)	2022: Purpose Trust took 100% of voting stock (about 2% of shares). Holdfast Collective, a 501(c)(4), took 98% non-voting stock and the profits not reinvested. Family guides the trust and still sits on the board. Cannot be taken public or sold in the ordinary way without the trust.	Voting control sits with an entity whose only job is the purpose. Economic residual claimant is an environmental nonprofit, so “shareholders” are not trying to extract the mission. B Corp status continues.	No public float. No activist can buy a block and demand a sale. The constraint is structural, not cultural.	Through early 2026 the Collective had received on the order of $100 million-plus in cumulative dividends (company had projected about $100 million a year, depending on results) and deployed capital into land and advocacy. Strongest lock in this set, because Chouinard gave the company away. Not available once outside investors already own the residual claim.
Danone	One share, one vote French listed company. In June 2020 shareholders approved société à mission status (PACTE law) by about 99%. A mission committee and an independent auditor monitor statutory objectives. No dual class.	The status survived the CEO. French law requires stated objectives and a mission committee; it does not let the mission committee fire management or block a board that wants a more conventional CEO.	Activists with a few percent, plus a board that lost confidence, were enough. Bluebell and Artisan did not need a super-vote.	Emmanuel Faber, the executive most identified with the mission, was removed as CEO and chair in March 2021 after underperformance versus peers. The société à mission status is still in the bylaws and still produces mission-committee reports (the 2024 report was the fifth). Purpose law did not protect the purpose-driven CEO. Financial recovery under Antoine de Saint-Affrique came with the mission language left in place and the governance fight already lost.

Sources for the rows above include Meta and Alphabet voting descriptions and the 2026 Class C plan, Snap’s zero-vote structure and later activist impasse, Warby Parker’s charter and conversion triggers, Lemonade’s charter thresholds, Coursera’s one-vote charter, Patagonia’s 2022 transfer, and Danone’s 2021 ouster plus later mission-committee reporting. [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35]

What has held up

Purpose statutes protect directors. They do not protect the mission from the people who elect directors. Danone is the clean case. Société à mission was adopted almost unanimously and is still on the books. The CEO who embodied it was removed within nine months by ordinary shareholder pressure and a board that blinked. Delaware’s PBC statute does the same job more explicitly: it displaces Revlon-style price maximization and then makes enforcement expensive and shareholder-only. Lemonade and Coursera show the mild version. The charter can raise the vote needed to delete the benefit (Lemonade’s two-thirds is meaningful), and a classified board slows a raid. Neither stops a determined majority from replacing management, resizing a giveback, or negotiating the mission away in a merger if both sides agree. Coursera keeping PBC status in the Udemy deal is a choice, not a lock.

Dual-class locks a person, not a purpose. Meta and Alphabet are the proof that 10-vote stock survives product failure, political heat, and a decade of one-share-one-vote proposals. Snap shows the endpoint: if the public has no vote at all, even the ritual of an annual meeting stops being a constraint, and a 75% drawdown does not create a ballot. Warby Parker is the hybrid worth watching. It pairs a PBC and a B Corp with founder super-votes, but it also has a hard sunset on October 1, 2031. That is the feature Meta’s 2026 Class C plan was designed to avoid. A sunset converts “founder vision” from a permanent exemption into a term appointment. None of these structures failed to hold control. They failed, when they failed, at the thing dual-class is often sold as: a guarantee that the controlled strategy was the long-term one shareholders would have wanted.

The designs that bind are the ones that move residual control away from people who profit by abandoning the mission. Patagonia is the extreme and, so far, the most stable. Voting stock sits in a purpose trust; the economic stock sits in a nonprofit that exists to spend the dividend on the planet. There is no outside holder who gets richer if the company is sold to a buyer that drops the charter. The cost was giving the company away, including a structure built to avoid a giant tax bill that would have forced a sale. That option closes once venture investors own the residual claim.

OpenAI and Anthropic are attempts to get some of that separation without a Patagonia giveaway. OpenAI’s version is external: a nonprofit parent with appointment and removal rights, a safety committee that can stop a release, a statutory instruction to ignore stockholder money on safety decisions, and two attorneys general who have already shown they will withhold non-objection and who have subpoena power afterward. The weakness is commercial, not formal. Microsoft’s 27% stake and through-2032 IP rights mean the largest economic partner can shape what “safety-compatible commercialization” looks like without sitting in the appointment seat. The 2026 Delaware subpoena is the first public sign that the AG conditions are a living constraint rather than a closing memo.

Anthropic’s version is internal and layered. The trust is closer to Patagonia’s purpose trust than to a nonprofit parent: disinterested trustees, no economics, power to seat a board majority, and an override that requires founders, employees, and the public together, or 85% of Class A if the founders’ share is gone. The Founder LLC share is closer to Meta: control that does not dilute as the company issues stock. The combination is stricter than Warby Parker’s PBC-plus-dual-class, because a founder majority of the stockholder vote still does not elect a majority of the board. It is weaker than OpenAI’s AG package on one axis: there is no outside official whose job is to sue if the trust goes quiet, and no committee with an explicit halt right sitting outside the PBC. It is stronger on another: Microsoft-scale partners are largely in non-voting stock, so they cannot carry a vote even if they wanted to.

For anyone designing the next one, the pattern is consistent. Write the mission into a PBC or société à mission charter if you want directors protected when they trade short-term price for the stated benefit. Do not expect that sentence to survive a board the residual claimants still elect. If the goal is to survive a bad year, a founder fight, or a strategic investor with a cloud contract, put the power to fire directors in an entity that does not get paid for abandoning the mission, make unwinding that entity a supermajority that founders cannot deliver alone, and if the nonprofit route is used, expect a regulator to be the only party who will actually enforce it. Dual-class without a sunset has held under as much pressure as any structure in this set. It has held the founder. That is a different product from a mission.

---

Recent Findings Supplement (November 2026)

Anthropic's October 2026 S-1 filing introduced the most significant new details on its hybrid governance structure since its 2023 Long-Term Benefit Trust (LTBT) creation.[1][2]

The filing (Oct 26, 2026) for a Nasdaq listing under ticker ANT describes a Delaware Public Benefit Corporation (PBC) with a "novel capital and corporate governance structure" using five share classes to separate economic rights from control while balancing stockholder interests, stakeholder impacts, and the stated public benefit ("responsible development and maintenance of advanced AI for the long-term benefit of humanity").[3]

• Class structure mechanics: Class A (public investors) gets 1 vote/share and pro-rata economics; Class N (strategic partners like Amazon/Google) has economics but minimal/no voting rights except where required by law; Class T (one share held by LTBT) elects/removes a board majority (Class T directors, initially 4 of 7 authorized seats) with no general voting or economics; Class F (one share to Founder LLC, controlled by the 7 co-founders) carries 50.1% of total voting power on general matters (including non-T director elections and most proposals) with no economics—the vote is not diluted by new issuances; Class E (employees, excluding founders) has limited voting on specific governance matters.[4][5]
• LTBT trustees (e.g., Ben Bernanke, Richard Fontaine, Neil Shah, Christopher Stubbs; financially disinterested experts) are self-perpetuating and independent; one board seat has safeguards (nominating committee concurrence or Class E vote for certain changes).[6]
• Anthropic qualifies as a Nasdaq "controlled company" (exemptions for board independence and committees) due to LTBT board power. Founders retain control "for the foreseeable future"; sunsets apply later (e.g., Class F when few founders remain; potential staggered board post-Class F).[7]
• Additional elements: 5% of shares (plus escalators on valuation milestones) to a Public Benefit Fund; founders pledged 80% of personal equity to charity.[8]

This layers PBC legal duties, an independent mission-focused trust for board majority, and founder voting supermajority—explicitly designed to insulate from investor pressure while enabling IPO capital.[9]

OpenAI's 2025 recapitalization (nonprofit OpenAI Foundation controlling OpenAI Group PBC) saw stake dilutions and ongoing AG oversight in 2026, with no major structural shifts.[10]

• Post-Oct 2025 closing: Foundation held ~26% equity (plus warrant) and appoints/removes the PBC board; Microsoft ~27% (diluted to ~24-25% by March 2026 $122B round and other factors); employees/investors the rest.[11]
• April 2026 partnership amendments with Microsoft adjusted revenue sharing (capped), cloud flexibility, and IP terms through 2032 (non-exclusive in some areas).[12]
• AG conditions (primarily 2025 MOUs from California and Delaware, with monitoring continuing): Nonprofit retains sole board appointment/removal power over PBC; identical missions; PBC directors must prioritize mission (disregard pecuniary interests) on safety/security issues; Safety & Security Committee stays under nonprofit with authority to halt model releases; majority-independent PBC board; quarterly AG oversight; commitments to remain in California and use charitable assets appropriately.[13][14]
• November 2026 development: Delaware DOJ issued an investigative subpoena to OpenAI (first compulsory action post-recap) following a Hugging Face-related incident, probing safety commitments and mission compliance under its authority over the nonprofit beneficiary.[15]
• October 2026 state AG lawsuits (multiple states) targeted ChatGPT safety/child safety claims under consumer protection laws, seeking injunctions and remedies like data deletion—not directly altering governance.[16]

Recent updates on other mission-driven or dual-class companies are limited and do not show structural changes.[17]

• Danone (Société à mission since 2020): April 2026 Mission Committee report covered 2025 progress on health/environment/social objectives (aligned with UN SDGs and B Corp); 2026 AGM approved all resolutions including governance renewals and 2025 results; leadership restructure (from 5 to 3 geographic segments effective 2026) for agility, with mission intact.[18][19]
• Patagonia (steward-ownership via Purpose Trust for voting control + Holdfast Collective for economics since 2022): No new 2026 governance developments reported.
• Dual-class examples (Meta, Alphabet, Snap, etc.): No recent mission-specific updates or pressure-test outcomes in sources.
• Broader steward-ownership discussions (e.g., Bosch, Orval) emphasize decoupling control from economics via trusts/foundations, but lack new AI-specific or enforcement data.[20]

Comparative table (drawing from Anthropic S-1 and OpenAI recap details as primary new sources; other companies via established mechanisms referenced in context):

Control Mechanism

- Anthropic: PBC + LTBT (Class T, majority board election) + Founder LLC (Class F, 50.1% general vote) + limited public input.[1]

- OpenAI: Nonprofit Foundation appoints/removes all PBC directors (post-2025 recap).[11]

- Dual-class (e.g., Meta): Founder supervoting shares for board/control.

- Mission entities (Danone Société à mission; Patagonia steward-ownership): Legal purpose in bylaws + mission committee/trust oversight; Patagonia uses Purpose Trust (voting) + nonprofit (economics).

Enforceability of Mission

- Anthropic: Delaware PBC duties (balance stockholders, stakeholders, purpose) + LTBT independence + charter provisions; founders as "stewards."

- OpenAI: Identical missions + AG MOUs requiring mission priority on safety; nonprofit oversight of Safety Committee.[14]

- Dual-class: Primarily contractual/founder discretion (weaker legal mission tie).

- Danone/Patagonia: Statutory mission reporting/audits (Danone); trust legal structure (Patagonia).

Shareholder Remedies

- Anthropic: Limited by control (public Class A has minimal influence); PBC fiduciary duties allow suits but controlled board/trust structure constrains; Nasdaq controlled-company status reduces some protections.

- OpenAI: AG enforcement (monitoring, potential suits); nonprofit beneficiary rights.[15]

- Dual-class: Standard fiduciary suits, but founder control often prevails.

- Danone: Mission committee reports + auditor; limited direct stakeholder suits. Patagonia: Trust/nonprofit standing.

Outcomes/Pressure Resilience (to date)

- Anthropic: Pre-IPO; designed for longevity beyond founders (sunsets, staggered board potential); no public tests yet.[2]

- OpenAI: Implemented 2025 with AG concessions; 2026 probe/suits test safety commitments.[15]

- Dual-class: Proven for founder retention (Meta, etc.) but mission drift risks under investor pressure.

- Danone/Patagonia: Ongoing reporting/activism; Patagonia emphasizes permanence via fractionated trusteeship.[21]

Lessons from recent developments emphasize layered, independent mechanisms over single-point controls for resilience.[22]

Anthropic's combination (PBC legal duty + independent LTBT board majority + founder voting bloc) creates checks that neither pure dual-class nor standalone PBC achieves alone, reducing takeover or drift risks while attracting capital—though it limits public shareholder influence and relies on trustee/founder alignment. OpenAI shows AG MOUs can add enforceable guardrails (e.g., safety vetoes, oversight) post-restructuring, but invite ongoing regulatory scrutiny (as in the 2026 Delaware probe).[13]

Pure dual-class excels at founder control but offers weaker mission enforceability without additional duties or trustees. Société à mission or steward models (Danone, Patagonia) provide statutory or trust-based accountability via reporting/audits but face enforcement gaps (e.g., auditor selection biases or limited stakeholder standing) unless augmented (as Patagonia does via economic control transfer).[21]

For entrants or competitors: Replicating Anthropic-style hybrids requires careful charter drafting and independent trustees; AG involvement (as in OpenAI) can strengthen enforceability but adds compliance costs and litigation exposure. Designs holding up best appear to combine legal mission mandates, independent oversight bodies, and concentrated (but mission-aligned) voting—rather than relying solely on founders or standard corporate forms. No new empirical studies on long-term outcomes emerged in the period.